A note on assignment games with the same nucleolus by Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier et al.
TOP manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
A note on assignment games with the same nucleolus
F. Javier Martı́nez-de-Albéniz · Carlos Rafels ·
Neus Ybern
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nu-
cleolus forms a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element. The above family is in
general not a convex set, but path-connected.
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1 Introduction
The assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is the cooperative viewpoint of a two-
sided market. There are two sides of the market, i.e. two disjoint sets of agents, buyers and
sellers, who can trade. The profits are collected in a matrix, the assignment matrix. The
allocation of the optimal profit should be such that no coalition has incentives to depart
from the grand coalition and act on its own. In doing so, a first game-theoretical analysis
of cooperation focuses on the core of the game. Shapley and Shubik show that the core of
any assignment game is always nonempty. It coincides with the set of solutions of the linear
F. Javier Martı́nez-de-Albéniz
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program, dual to the classical optimal assignment problem. A recent survey on assignment
games is Núñez and Rafels (2015).
Among other solutions, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a “fair” solution in the gen-
eral context of cooperative games. It is a unique core-selection that lexicographically mini-
mizes the excesses1 arranged in a nondecreasing way. The standard procedure for computing
the nucleolus proceeds by solving a finite (but large) number of related linear programs. As
a solution concept, the nucleolus has been analyzed and computed in many cooperative
games. Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) gives an algorithm for the computation of the nucle-
olus of the assignment game, computed in polynomial time. Recently Martı́nez-de-Albéniz
et al. (2013b) provides a new procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game.
An interesting survey on the nucleolus and its computational complexity is given in Greco
et al. (2015). The description of the 2× 2 case is discussed in Martı́nez-de-Albéniz et al.
(2013a).
In this paper we focus on the structure of the family of assignment matrices that give
rise to the same nucleolus. The main contributions of the paper are the following:
– The family of matrices with the same nucleolus forms a join-semilattice, i.e. closed by
entry-wise maximum. The family has a unique maximum element which is always a
valuation matrix.2
– We show that the above family is a path-connected set and give a precise path, connect-
ing any matrix of the family with its maximum element.
2 Preliminaries on the assignment game
An assignment market (M,M′,A) is defined to be two disjoint finite sets: M the set of buyers
and M′ the set of sellers, and a nonnegative matrix A = (ai j)i∈M, j∈M′ which represents the
profit obtained by each mixed-pair (i, j) ∈M×M′. To distinguish the j-th seller from the j-
th buyer we will write the former as j′ when needed. The assignment market is called square
whenever |M|= |M′| . Usually we denote by m = |M| and m′ = |M′| . M+m denotes the set of
nonnegative square matrices with m rows and columns, and M+m×m′ the set of nonnegative
matrices with m rows and m′ columns.
Recall that M+m×m′ forms a lattice with the usual ordering ≤ between matrices. The
maximum C = A∨ B of two matrices A,B ∈ M+m×m′ is defined entry-wise, i.e. as ci j =
max{ai j,bi j} for all (i, j) ∈ M×M′. Given an ordered subset of matrices (F ,≤) ,F ⊆
M+m×m′ , we say matrix C ∈F is a maximal (minimal) element of (F ,≤) if whenever there
is a matrix D ∈F with D ≥ (≤)C, then D = C. Matrix C ∈F is a maximum element of
(F ,≤) if C ≥ D for all D ∈F .
A matching µ ⊆ M×M′ between M and M′ is a bijection from M0 ⊆ M to M′0 ⊆ M′
with |M0|=
∣∣M′0∣∣= min{|M| , |M′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ (i) or i = µ−1 ( j).
If for some buyer i ∈ M there is no seller j ∈ M′ satisfying (i, j) ∈ µ we say buyer i is
unmatched by µ and similarly for sellers. The set of all matchings from M to M′ is repre-
sented by M (M,M′) . A matching µ ∈M (M,M′) is optimal for (M,M′,A) if ∑(i, j)∈µ ai j ≥
∑(i, j)∈µ ′ ai j for any µ ′ ∈M (M,M′) . We denote by M ∗A (M,M′) the set of all optimal match-
ings.
1 Given a coalition S ⊆ N, and an allocation x ∈ RN the excess of a coalition is defined as e(S,x) :=
v(S)−∑i∈S xi. Notice they can be considered as complaints.
2 In a valuation matrix any 2×2 submatrix has two optimal matchings. A formal definition is found after
the proof of Theorem 1.
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Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate any assignment market with a game in coalitional
form (M∪M′,wA) called the assignment game in which the worth of a coalition S∪T ⊆
M ∪M′ with S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M′ is wA (S∪T ) = max
µ∈M (S,T )
∑(i, j)∈µ ai j, and any coalition
formed only by buyers or sellers has a worth of zero.
The main goal is to allocate the total worth among the agents, and a prominent solution
for cooperative games is the core. Shapley and Shubik (1972) prove that the core of the
assignment game is always nonempty. Given an optimal matching µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) , the
core of the assignment game, C(wA), can be easily described as the set of nonnegative payoff
vectors (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ satisfying
xi + y j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (1)
xi + y j ≥ ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′, (2)
and all agents unmatched by µ get a null payoff.
Now we define the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) of an assignment game, taking into
account that its core is always nonempty. The excess of a coalition /0 6= R ⊆ M ∪M′ with
respect to an allocation in the core, (x,y) ∈ C(wA), is defined as e(R,(x,y)) := wA (R)−
∑i∈R∩M xi−∑ j∈R∩M′ y j. By the bilateral nature of the market, it is known that the only coali-
tions that matter are the individual and mixed-pair ones (Núñez, 2004). Given an allocation
(x,y) ∈C(wA), define the excess vector θ (x,y) = (θk)k=1,...,r as the vector of individual and
mixed-pair coalitions excesses arranged in a non-increasing order, i.e. θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ . . . ≥ θr.
Then the nucleolus of the game (M∪M′,wA) is the unique core allocation ν (wA) ∈C(wA)
which minimizes θ (x,y) with respect to the lexicographic order3 over the whole set of core
allocations. For ease of notation we will use, for A ∈M+m×m′ , ν (A) instead of ν (wA) if no
confusion arises.
We use the characterization of the nucleolus of a square assignment game of Llerena and
Núñez (2011), see also Llerena et al. (2015). To introduce this characterization we define
the maximum transfer from a coalition to another coalition.
Given any square assignment game (M∪M′,wA) , and two arbitrary coalitions /0 6= S ⊆
M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ we define
δ
A
S,T (x,y) := min
i∈S, j∈M′\T
{





T,S (x,y) := min
j∈T,i∈M\S
{
y j,xi + y j−ai j
}
,
for any core allocation (x,y) ∈C (wA).
Llerena and Núñez (2011) gives a geometric characterization of the nucleolus of a square
assignment game. They prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment game is character-
ized as the unique core allocation (x,y) ∈C(wA) such that
δ
A
S,T (x,y) = δ
A
T,S (x,y) (3)
for any /0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with |S|= |T |. In certain cases, the number of equalities
can be reduced. Indeed, note that if T 6= µ(S) for some µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) , then it holds
δ AS,T (x,y) = δ
A
T,S (x,y) = 0. Therefore, for this characterization we only have to check (3) for
the cases T = µ(S) for some optimal matching µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) and any /0 6= S⊆M, i.e.
δ
A
S,µ(S) (x,y) = δ
A
µ(S),S (x,y) , for any /0 6= S⊆M. (4)
3 The lexicographic order ≥lex on Rd is defined in the following way: x≥lex y, where x,y ∈ Rd , if x = y
or if there exists 1≤ t ≤ d such that xk = yk for all 1≤ k < t and xt > yt .
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To analyze the non-square case we can use two different approaches and we will apply
both of them.
The first and classical approach consists in adding null rows or columns in order to make
the initial matrix square. The added rows or columns correspond to dummy agents and they
receive a null payoff at any core allocation and hence also in the nucleolus. At this extended
square assignment matrix we apply the previous geometric characterization. Notice that the
number of coalitions to be checked grows quickly for each added agent.
To fix our first approach we introduce some notation. Given any arbitrary assignment
matrix A ∈ M+m×m′ , with m < m
′ and where µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is an optimal
matching for A, we define the following square matrix A0 ∈ M+m′ obtained from the origi-
nal matrix A by adding m′−m zero rows, that is m′−m dummy players. Let M0 = M ∪








ai j if (i, j) ∈M×M′,
0 if (i, j) ∈ (M0\M)×M′. (5)
We know that the matching µ0 = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m′,m′)} is optimal for matrix A0.
The second approach is an adaptation of the consistency property of the nucleolus, see
Llerena et al. (2015), and it can be found in Martı́nez-de-Albéniz et al. (2015). It keeps the
dimension of the problem as low as we can and it has an interest on its own. Basically it
consists in reducing the assignment problem to an appropriate square matrix, dropping out
those agents unassigned by an optimal matching, and reassessing the matrix entries. Apart
from the dimension issue, the main feature of this approach is that we must not care about
the added zero rows or columns when we deal with the matrix.
To introduce the second approach we need some notations. Let (M,M′,A) ,A ∈M+m×m′
be a non-square assignment market with m < m′ and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) be an optimal











for each buyer i ∈M, (6)
and define the square matrix Aµ ∈M+m by




, for (i, j) ∈M×µ (M) . (7)
Then the relationship between their nucleolus is the following one:
νi(A) = νi(Aµ)+a
µ
i , for i ∈M, (8)
ν j(A) =
{
ν j(Aµ) for j ∈ µ(M), and
0 for j ∈M′\µ (M) . (9)
Moreover the fixed matching µ is also optimal for matrix Aµ .
An example of the application of this second approach is the following. Consider matrix
A =
(
8 6 7 1 0
11 12 3 4 5
)
,
where the optimal matching is denoted in boldface, µ = {(1,1),(2,2)}. Now vector aµ =







The nucleolus of the game wAµ is ν(Aµ) = (0.5,6.25;0.5,0.75), and then the nucleolus of
the game wA is ν(A) = (7.5,11.25;0.5,0.75,0,0,0).
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3 Assignment games with the same nucleolus
We introduce the family of matrices with a given nucleolus. To this end, for an arbitrary
assignment matrix A ∈M+m×m′ we denote by
[A]ν :=
{
B ∈M+m×m′ | ν (B) = ν (A)
}
the family of matrices that share the same nucleolus as A.
It is clear that matrices with the same nucleolus must have the same worth for the grand










For any assignment game there exists a unique matrix, its buyer-seller exact representative,
among those leading to the same core, such that no matrix entry can be raised without
modifying its core (Núñez and Rafels, 2002). From Núñez (2004) assignment games with
the same core have the same nucleolus. In particular for each matrix in [A]ν its corresponding
buyer-seller exact representative always belongs to the family. Nevertheless, as we will see,
assignment matrices with different cores may also share the same nucleolus.
We focus now on the structure of this family [A]ν : it is a nonempty compact join-
semilattice4 with a unique maximal element. Secondly we characterize this maximum and
show it is a specific type of assignment matrix, a valuation matrix.
Theorem 1 Let A ∈ M+m×m′ be an assignment matrix. The family [A]ν forms a compact
join-semilattice with a unique maximal element.
Proof First we prove that this family is a join-semilattice. Let B,B′ ∈ [A]ν . If m 6= m′, we
add zero rows or columns to make the matrices square, recall (5). It is known that these rows
or columns correspond to dummy players which obtain zero payoff at any core allocation,
and also in the nucleolus. Therefore we can assume from now on that matrices are square.
We have B,B′ ≤ B∨B′, and also C(wB)∩C(wB′) 6= /0, since both games share the nucleolus.
We claim
C(wB)∩C(wB′) =C(wB∨B′).
To see it, take any (x,y) ∈C(wB)∩C(wB′). It is clear xi + y j ≥max{bi j,b′i j} for all (i, j) ∈
M×M′. Then for any optimal matching µ of matrix B∨B′ we have
wB∨B′(M∪M′) = ∑
(i, j)∈µ
max{bi j,b′i j} ≤ ∑
(i, j)∈µ
(xi + y j) = wB(M∪M′) = wB′(M∪M′).
As a consequence wB∨B′(M ∪M′) = wB(M ∪M′) = wB′(M ∪M′). Now it is easy to see
(x,y) ∈C(wB∨B′). The other inclusion is straightforward.
Now to see ν (B) = ν (B′) = (x,y) is the nucleolus of wB∨B′ , just note that, for all /0 6=
S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with |S|= |T |,
δ
B∨B′




















4 A family F ⊆M+m×m′ is a join-semilattice if A∨B ∈F for all A,B ∈F .
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As a consequence, since (x,y) is the nucleolus of wB and wB′ , we obtain the equality
δ B∨B
′
S,T (x,y) = δ
B∨B′
T,S (x,y) , proving that B∨B′ ∈ [A]ν .
Now we show that this family is a compact set, and therefore with a unique maximal
element. We show that it is bounded and closed. It is bounded since 0≤ bi j ≤ xi + y j for all
(i, j) ∈M×M′ and B ∈ [A]ν with ν(A) = (x,y). It is closed because the functions δ BS,T (x,y)
and δ BT,S (x,y) are continuous in B ∈M
+
m×m′ for all /0 6= S ⊆M, /0 6= T ⊆M
′ and |S| = |T | ,
and they must satisfy equalities (3). ut
In contrast with the previous result, the minimum defined entry-wise of two matrices
with the same nucleolus may not have the same nucleolus, see matrices in (10).
Now we introduce a kind of assignment matrices, useful for our purposes. A matrix
A ∈M+m×m′ is a valuation matrix
5 if for any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m′} we
have ai1 j1 + ai2 j2 = ai1 j2 + ai2 j1 . Clearly this definition is equivalent to see that any 2× 2
submatrix has two optimal matchings.
Obviously, any fully-optimal6 square matrix is a valuation matrix, and for square ma-
trices the converse also holds. This characterization fails for non-square matrices as the
following matrix shows:
D =
 3 6 8 1 04 7 9 2 1
6 9 11 4 3
 . (11)
This is a valuation matrix, but clearly not all matchings are optimal.
Finally we want to point out two general properties for non-square valuation matrices.
Let A ∈ M+m×m′ be a non-square valuation matrix with m < m
′ and µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) any
optimal matching, Then:
(i) The square submatrix AM×µ(M) is fully-optimal. Its worth is wA(M∪M′).
(ii) The entries of matrix A satisfy ai j1 ≥ ai j2 for all i ∈M, j1 ∈ µ(M) and j2 ∈M′ \µ(M).
Theorem 2 Let A ∈M+m×m′ be an assignment matrix. The maximal element of the family
[A]ν is a valuation matrix.
Proof Let ν(A) = (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ be the nucleolus of matrix A ∈M+m×m′ , where we as-
sume without loss of generality that m≤m′ and µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is an optimal
matching for A.
Define now matrix A ∈M+m×m′ as follows
ai j =
{








(i) ai j ≥ 0, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′,
(ii) A ∈ [A]ν , i.e. ν(A) = ν(A),
(iii) A is the maximum of the family [A]ν , and clearly a valuation matrix.
5 Following Topkis (1998), a function is a valuation if it is submodular and supermodular.
6 A ∈M+m×m′ is a fully-optimal matrix if all matchings are optimal, i.e. M
∗
A (M,M
′) = M (M,M′)
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To prove claim (i), let A0,M0, and µ0 the notation introduced in (5) to make square the






+ the vector defined by x
0
k = xk if k ∈M









and then δ A
0
M,µ0(M)(x

















{x0i ,x0i + y0j −a0i j}=
=




{xi−ai j} if m < m′.
where we have used that y0j = y j = 0 for j ∈M′ \µ(M) and x0i = xi ≥ xi−ai j for i ∈M and
j ∈M′ \µ(M).
From the above equality we easily deduce xi ≥ min
j∈µ(M)
{y j} for i ∈M which proves our
first claim.
We prove claim (ii), ν(A) = (x,y), by proving its equivalent form, ν((A)0) = (x0,y0).
Notice that µ0 = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m′,m′)} is optimal for matrix (A)0. To prove ν((A)0) =
(x0,y0), we distinguish several cases depending on an arbitrary coalition S⊆M0,S 6= /0 :
Case 1: S∩ (M0 \M) 6= /0. We obtain δ (A)
0
S,µ0(S)(x
0,y0) = 0 and δ (A)
0
µ0(S),S(x
0,y0) = 0, since
x0i = 0 for all i∈ S∩(M0 \M) for the first equality and there exists j ∈ µ0(S)∩(M′ \µ(M)),
which implies y j = 0 for the second.
Case 2: S⊆M,S 6=M. We obtain δ (A)
0
S,µ0(S)(x
0,y0) = 0, since there exists j ∈ µ(M)\µ(S)


















{x0i ,x0i + y0j −a0i j}=
=













{y j}, if m < m′.
Now, for m < m′ they trivially coincide and for m = m′, the square case, they coincide since
ν(A) = (x,y), and then δ AM,µ(M)(x,y) = mini∈M
{xi}= δ Aµ(M),M(x,y) = minj∈µ(M)
{y j}.
Therefore, we have proved the second claim.
To prove claim (iii), let B ∈ [A]ν be an arbitrary matrix of the family. We can assume
that µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is optimal for matrix B, since in other case, we consider
matrix B∨A as a new matrix B, see Theorem 1 and notice B≤ B∨A. Recall ν(B) = ν(A) =
(x,y). Clearly ai j = xi + y j ≥ bi j for 1≤ i, j ≤ m.
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If m = m′ we are done, and B≤ A. Otherwise, m < m′. Consider matrix B0, see (5). We














{x0i ,x0i + y0j −b0i j}= min
i∈M, j∈M′\µ(M)
{xi−bi j}.






ai j = xi− min
j∈µ(M)
{y j} ≥ bi j for all i ∈M, j ∈M′ \µ(M).
This ends our third claim, and proves the maximality of matrix A since we have seen that in
the non-square case, B≤ A. The fact that A is a valuation matrix is left to the reader. ut
From the proof of Theorem 2 we expect several valuation matrices if the initial assign-
ment matrix is not square. In (11) we have introduced matrix D∈M+3×5 which is an example
of such a situation. By (4), (8) and (9) it is easy to check that the nucleolus of matrix D is
ν(D) = (2,3,5;1,4,6,0,0) and the maximum matrix of [D]ν is given by the valuation matrix
D =
 3 6 8 1 14 7 9 2 2
6 9 11 4 4
 ,
which is strictly greater than the valuation matrix D. Both valuation matrices share the same
nucleolus.
In the proof of Theorem 2 we have found the expression of the maximum element of
family [A]ν , with ν(A) = (x,y). It is matrix A ∈M+m×m′ as follows
ai j =
{






for (i, j) ∈M× (M′ \µ(M)), (12)
where µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) is an optimal matching. A close look at (12) could raise expectations
of different maximum matrices A depending on the chosen optimal matching µ, but this is
not the case, as it is easy to check.
The family [A]ν is not, in general, a convex set. To see it, consider the following matrices



















is the midpoint between both matrices, B = 12 A+
1
2 A, and it does not have the same nucleo-
lus. We have ν(B) = (1.75,6.25;12.25,1.75).
Now we prove an interesting property. There is a continuous piecewise linear path be-
tween any matrix in [A]ν and its maximum element A. From here it is clear that the family
[A]ν is a path-connected set.
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Theorem 3 Let A ∈M+m×m′ be an assignment matrix, and A ∈ [A]ν the maximal element of
the family. Then for any B ∈ [A]ν there exists an increasing piecewise linear path7 from B to
A inside [A]ν . As a consequence, the family [A]ν is a path-connected set. In particular, for
any B ∈ [A]ν ,B 6= A, there exists C ∈ [A]ν with B <C < A.8
Proof First we analyze the square case, m = m′. We can assume |M| = |M′| ≥ 2. Let it
be B ∈ [A]ν , and ν(A) = ν(B) = (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ . Let us define the set formed by the






S,T (x,y) |S⊆M,T ⊆M′, |S|= |T |,S 6= /0,M, and T 6= /0,M′
}
.
These elements are used for the characterization of the nucleolus and correspond to the
minimum of some numbers. The elements of ∆(B) can be ordered increasingly:
0 = δ B0 < δ
B
1 < .. . < δ
B
r∗ ,
and then ∆(B) = {δ B0 ,δ B1 , . . . ,δ Br∗}.
From these parameters we can define a new matrix B0 with the same nucleolus. We set
b0i j = bi j if xi + y j−bi j ∈ ∆(B), and we raise the worth of entry bi j to b0i j in such a way that
xi+y j−b0i j equals the closest one-below element of ∆(B), that is, if δ Bk < xi+y j−bi j < δ Bk+1
for some k, then b0i j = xi + y j−δ Bk .
It is clear that matrix B0 has the same nucleolus as matrix B since the equalities of
the geometric characterization of the nucleolus haven’t changed and therefore B0 ∈ [A]ν .
Moreover ∆(B) = ∆(B0). We may choose increasing linear paths from B to B0, one for
each entry to raise. Notice that since we are moving up the entries that do not determine the
distances of ∆(B), all matrices on these paths will preserve the original nucleolus.
Now we have a matrix B0 ∈ [A]ν such that xi + y j−b0i j ∈ ∆(B0) for all (i, j) ∈M×M′.
Moreover if δ B
0
S,T (x,y) = δ
B
r∗ , for some S⊂M and T ⊂M
′ with |S|= |T | 6= m, then we have,
for all i ∈ S and j /∈ T, xi + y j−b0i j = δ Br∗ . We finish the proof in the square case by raising
the entries of matrix B0 iteratively up to get A.
Firstly, notice that if r∗ = 0, that is ∆(B) = ∆(B0) = {0}. Then matrix B0 coincides with
the valuation matrix of the family A since then xi+y j = b0i j for all (i, j)∈M×M′, and recall
m = m′.
Otherwise, r∗ > 0. In this case, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ such that xi + y j−b0i j = δ B
0
r∗ raise
linearly and simultaneously b0i j to b
1
i j defined by the equality xi+y j−b1i j = δ B
0
r∗−1. We obtain
a new matrix B1 ∈ [A]ν , defined for all i ∈M and j ∈M′ by
b1i j =
{
xi + y j−δ B
0
r∗−1 if xi + y j−b
0




It is easy to see that ∆(B1)⊆ ∆(B0), and ∆(B1) 6= ∆(B0). This means we have reduced the
set of distances related with the nucleolus. Once again by (3) it is easy to see that ν(B1) =
(x,y) or equivalently B1 ∈ [A]ν .
7 A path in X ⊆M+m×m′ from A to B, A,B∈X , is a continuous function f from the unit interval I = [0,1]
to X , i.e. f : [0,1]→X , with f (0) = A and f (1) = B. Moreover a subset X ⊆M+m×m′ is path-connected if
for any two elements A,B ∈X there exists a path from A to B entirely contained in X .
8 If B,C ∈M+m×m′ , B <C if and only if B≤C and B 6=C.
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Now, in a finite number of steps, proceed sequentially raising all entries until for all
(i, j) ∈M×M′ we have xi +y j−br∗i j = 0. That is, matrix Br∗ coincides with matrix A for the
square case. In it all matchings are optimal.
For the non-square case, we assume |M|< |M′| . Let B ∈ [A]ν , and let µ ∈M ∗B (M,M′)
be an optimal matching.
Notice first that matrix B can be modified without changing its nucleolus in the following
way:





(ii) for all (i, j) ∈M× (M′ \ µ(M)) raise entries bi j to bµi , and we do not modify the rest
of entries.
This new matrix, denoted by B̃ has the same nucleolus and then B̃∈ [A]ν . Indeed, matrix
B̃ has also µ as an optimal matching and then by definition it has the same square matrix
Bµ ∈M+m , i.e. (B̃)µ = Bµ , see (7). It is easy to see that the relationships between matrices B̃
and (B̃)µ are
b̃µi j = b̃i j−b
µ
i for all (i, j) ∈M×µ(M). (13)











= (x′,y′) ∈ RM+ ×R
µ(M)




i for i ∈M, and y′j = y j for
j ∈ µ(M).
We can apply the previous procedure for square matrices to obtain an increasing piece-
wise linear path from (B̃)µ to its maximum matrix in [(B̃)µ ]ν . This path, applied to matrix
B̃M×µ(M), see (13), induces a path from B̃M×µ(M) to AM×µ(M), where A denotes the maxi-
mum element of the family [A]ν .




























. That is, for i∗ ∈M we have
ai∗ j = b
µ
i∗ for all j ∈M
′ \µ(M). For any i 6= i∗, i ∈M such that x′i > mini∈M {x
′
i} or equivalently












, we can raise at the
same time entries b̃i j = b
µ




for all j ∈M′ \µ(M) without changing
the nucleolus, as the reader can check applying (8) and (9). This ends the proof. ut
As a direct consequence of the above theorem we obtain that there is a continuum of




















, k > 0.
Notice that if matrix A is not the maximal element A ∈ [A]ν Theorem 3 makes it obvious. If
m≥ 3, A = A and different from the null matrix we can lower one nonzero entry and get the
same nucleolus, see (12). If m = 2 and A = A there are two optimal matchings. Then if one
of the matchings has both entries positive, we can lower them equally a small amount and
get the same nucleolus.
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